

### A Global Overview of Offshore Oil & Gas Asset Integrity Issues



#### IROSC Miami, Florida USA

Graeme A.E. Pirie & Erik Østby 4 December 2007

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### What is Asset Integrity?



#### Asset Integrity (AI): Definition

Al is a <u>continuous</u> process of <u>knowledge</u> and <u>experience</u> applied throughout the <u>lifecycle</u> to <u>manage</u> the <u>risk</u> of failures and events in design, construction, and during operation of facilities to ensure <u>optimal</u> production without <u>compromising</u> <u>safety</u>, <u>health</u> and <u>environmental</u> requirements

<u>Design Integrity</u> - "Assure design for safe operations"


Assurance that facilities are designed in accordance with governing standards and meet specified operating requirements

Technical Integrity - "Keep it in"

Appropriate work processes for Maintenance & inspection systems and data mgt. to keep the operations available

Operational Integrity - "Keep it Running"

Appropriate knowledge, experience, manning, competence and decision making data to operate the plant as intended throughout its lifecycle



### The EVOLUTION of Offshore O&G Asset Integrity





Prescriptive rules and regulations

Certification & Verification

Reporting of events

Inspection data collection

Experienced based maint. planning

Safety Case

QRA for design of Safety Function

Condition Assessment

Design life criteria

RCM/RBI for maint. planning

Major accident focus

Management of techn. safety barriers

Reliability Mgmt.

Failure mode and effects consequence/

likelihood criteria

**Program Performance** 

Major hazards Mgmt. of techn. & human safety barriers

A&OI/safety mgmt. sys, leadership & work processes

Integrated operations

Online decision making by expert groups

### General AIM issues in the industry today



#### **Design Integrity:**

- Long tradition in the industry to design safety barriers according to regulations and recognised international standards, followed by in-depth verification programs in design and construction.
- Struggle with transfer of data and knowledge from construction to operation.
- Struggle with change management control.

#### **Technical Integrity:**

- Maintenance management systems (CMMS) are in place.
- Varying quality of planning and prioritisation; expert judgement, rather than based on risk models and in-house experience data.
- Reporting of failure information generally poor for optimisation purposes
- Drawing conclusions and prescribing actions

#### **Operational Integrity:**

- Overall work process for maintenance/inspection planning and execution well established
- Inadequate integration of maintenance and safety work processes
- Work processes for analysis of experience data and continuous improvement not in place
- Traditionally, operators and maintenance disciplines technically competent, but lack analytical skills required for application of more systematic and advanced decision models.
- Struggle with knowledge management

### General AIM issues in the industry today (cont.)



"Leadership not setting the process safety "tone at the top", nor providing effective leadership or cascading expectations or core values to make effective process safety happen".

Source:Baker report after Texas City accident:

"Many senior managers are not making adequate use of integrity management data and are not giving ongoing maintenance sufficient priority"

Source: UK HSE




Asset integrity lacks the attention from top management



### General AIM issues in the industry Today Cont.


#### Present practice does not support continuous improvement processes





### General AIM issues in the industry today (cont.)

Most operators do not have adequate work processes, resources, tools and experience data supporting continuous improvement processes




The role of asset integrity and concept of barriers in major hazard risk control is not well understood.

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# Inadequate integration of maintenance and safety work processes






# Best practice: Integration of safety, reliability and maintenance processes



Maintenance management



Safety management

Reliability management

Big challenge to prioritize resources between safety and production reliability improvements

### Today's main safety focus?



#### **Traditional areas:**

**KPI = Occupational risk indicators:** 

- Lost Time Incidents
- Medical Treatment
- Restricted Work Case






#### More attention required!

- Tracking of Near-misses with major potentials
- Establishment of Technical Safety Barriers

# The Baker Report after the Texas City accident states:

"Focus on occupational safety, but omitting emphasis on process safety creating a false sense of confidence that safety was well managed."

#### Initiating event stopped by a functioning safety barrier








#### Case1: UK Sector of the North Sea

Speaking at the launch of the KP3 report, Health and Safety Commission Chair, Judith Hackitt said:

". . . . . there can be no mistaking our message to those in the board rooms of the oil and gas offshore companies - there is still much more to do and those in a position of leadership must ensure that systems, procedures and best practice is adopted to achieve the goal of the UK continental shelf becoming the safest offshore sector by 2010".

"Companies need better key indicators of performance available at the most senior management levels to inform decisionmaking and to focus resources."

#### Case 2: Norwegian Sector of the North Sea



**Estimated for 40 installations in the NCS** 

All kind of findings from low to high criticality

**Deviations from Best Practice** 

>15000

Technical condition unacceptable: ~10%. Gaps which requires upgrading.

### **Indicator on Technical Safety Availability**



T - rate

## Barrier test Indicator (B)

**Examples:** 

Safety valves

Fire & gas detectors

Shut down valves

Deluge

**ESD** buttons

# **Inspection Indicator (I)**

**Examples**:

**Pipelines** 

Vessels

Cranes

# Override Indicator (O)

**Examples:** 

Safety valves

Fire & gas detectors

Limit switches

Control loops

**Alarms** 















### Concluding remarks







Mature Regulation and Corporate Governance- Goal Setting and/or Prescriptive Regimes
Regulatory Mention and/or Corporate Governance – Predominately Prescriptive Regimes
Corporate Governance Only



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## Thanks for your attention!

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